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Abstract
Additive Manufacturing (AM, or 3D printing) is a novel
manufacturing technology that is being adopted in indus-
trial and consumer settings. However, the reliance of this
technology on computerization has raised various secu-
rity concerns. In this paper we address sabotage via tam-
pering with the 3D printing process. We present an ob-
ject verification system using side-channel emanations:
sound generated by onboard stepper motors. The contri-
butions of this paper are following. We present two algo-
rithms: one which generates a master audio fingerprint
for the unmodified printing process, and one which com-
putes the similarity between other print recordings and
the master audio fingerprint. We then evaluate the devia-
tion due to tampering, focusing on the detection of min-
imal tampering primitives. By detecting the deviation at
the time of its occurrence, we can stop the printing pro-
cess for compromised objects, thus save time and prevent
material waste. We discuss impacts on the method by as-
pects like background noise, or different audio recorder
positions. We further outline our vision with use cases
incorporating our approach.
1 Introduction
Additive Manufacturing (AM), often referred to as 3D
printing, is a manufacturing technology that creates parts
and prototypes by incrementally fusing layers of material
together. This manufacturing technology can create ob-
jects from polymers, metals and alloys, and composites.
AM has numerous technological, environmental and
socioeconomic advantages. These include the ability
to manufacture objects with complex internal structures,
shorter design-to-production time, just-in-time and on-
demand production, and reduce source material waste.
These advantages enable a broad range of applications,
ranging from models and prototypes up to functional
parts in safety-critical systems. A recent example of the
Figure 1: Sabotaged Quadcopter’s Propeller breaks dur-
ing Flight (dr0wned study [2])
latter is the FAA-approved 3D-printed fuel nozzle for the
GE’s state of the art LEAP jet engine [20].
According to the Wohlers Report, a renowned annual
survey of advances in AM, in 2015 the AM industry ac-
counted for $5.165 billion of revenue, with 32.5% of all
AM-manufactured objects used as functional parts. A
study conducted by Ernst & Young [10] shows rapidly
growing adoption of this technology worldwide. In the
U.S. alone, 16% of surveyed companies have experience
with AM and another 16% are considering adopting this
technology in the future.
Due to the growing importance of AM and its re-
liance on computerization, many researchers have raised
security concerns. So far, two major threat categories
have been identified for AM: (1) sabotage [21, 25, 27,
30, 28, 2, 17] and (2) violation of Intellectual Property
(IP) [25, 24, 4, 11]. Sabotage attacks aim to inflict phys-
ical damage, e.g., by compromising part quality or by
damaging AM equipment. IP violation attacks aim to
illegally replicate 3D objects or the manufacturing pro-
cess itself. Additionally, several articles discuss using
3D printers to manufacture illegal items, e.g., firearms,
or components of explosive devices [3, 15, 14].
This paper exclusively focuses on sabotage attacks and
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proposes a method of detecting such attacks. The im-
portance of combating these attacks is illustrated by the
recent dr0wned study [2].
In the study, the researchers presented a full chain of
attack with AM, and introduced a novel cyber-physical
attack impacting the material fatigue of a functional part.
The authors sabotaged the 3D printed propeller of a
quadcopter UAV, causing the propeller to break and the
quadcopter to fall from the sky after a short period of
flight time (see Figure 1). While this only led to the loss
of a $1000 drone, similar attacks on functional parts for
safety-critical systems may cause tremendous monetary
losses, disruptions, and loss of human life.
In this paper, we propose a method capable of detect-
ing such cyber-physical attacks via side-channel audio
verification.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows:
we first present the considered threat model on the manu-
facturing process in section 2. Next we introduce the pro-
posed solution in section 3. Section 4 presents an evalu-
ation of the detection capabilities of the solution and its
limitations. In section 5, we discuss various use cases
that can deploy the proposed solution. Lastly, we discuss
previous work in this area in section 6.
2 Considered Threat Model
Although the central function of any AM process is the
3D printing itself, there are many stages involving other
equipment and technologies. Typically, a 3D object’s
blueprint (in STL, AMF, or 3MF file format) is first
stored on a computer. Before printing, the 3D model is
“sliced” by a program into individual layers. For desk-
top 3D printers that employ Fused Deposition Modeling
(FDM) technology, the open source softwares like Slic3r
or Cura are commonly used. The parameters like “fill
density” and “fill pattern” influence how the source ma-
terial is actually deposited in an individual layer. The
description of these layers can vary greatly between dif-
ferent AM technologies.
The tool path generated by this stage is then trans-
mitted to 3D printer via USB, SD card or network con-
nection. The tool path is commonly composed of G-
Code commands, a legacy language for CNC machines.
The individual G-Code commands are interpreted by the
firmware installed on a 3D printer and translated to elec-
trical signals for individual actuators, such as motors for
X/Y/Z movement and filament extrusion, or a heater noz-
zle, etc.
In this workflow, cyber threats arise because each of
the 3D model representations can be corrupted. Re-
searchers have shown that the original blueprint file can
be corrupted via remote access to the computer [2] or
by malware running on a computer [21]. Vulnerabili-
ties in network communications can be exploited to alter
print jobs [9]. It has been suggested that models can be
modified or even completely substituted by malicious 3D
printer firmware [17].
Regardless of the representation compromised, the
Cyber-Physical impact depends on the physical change
of the printed object. Researchers have shown that
changes to 3D model alone1 can prevent its integrabil-
ity [23, 17], reduce its tensile strength [21, 30], or im-
pact its fatigue life [2]. Especially in the case of a func-
tional part, such changes can lead to the destruction of a
CPS employing this part, as shown in the recent dr0wned
study [2].
3 Proposed Solution
In this section, we propose a solution for the detection of
the sabotage attacks that change a 3D printed object’s ge-
ometry. We describe how the 3D printing process’ audio
fingerprints can be generated and verified. We conclude
this section with the description of how two audio finger-
prints can be compared.
3.1 General Concept: Verification via Au-
dio Side-Channel Fingerprinting
While the protection of every translation stage and repre-
sentation of a 3D object description is theoretically pos-
sible, it has numerous drawbacks. From the operations
point of view, this would require the protection of multi-
ple stages with negative impacts on the overall perfor-
mance of the 3D printing process. In the worst case,
introducing security measures could interfere with time-
critical processes, degrading a manufactured part’s me-
chanical properties. From the security stand point, the
complexity of such a solution will likely be accompa-
nied by new vulnerabilities. Furthermore, if the secu-
rity mechanisms are integrated into equipment involved
in the 3D printing process, any malicious code that can
change the process can also disable or bypass the security
mechanisms. Therefore, there is need for a verification
method that is independent of the manufacturing process
equipment.
Similar to the KCAD approach of Chhetri et al. [6],
we exploit that in the FDM technology, the geometry of
a printed object is defined by the movements of four step-
per motors (for X/Y/Z axes and filament extrusion), each
of which generate noise with unique characteristics. To
detect manipulations, we propose to record and digitally
1Changes of manufacturing process as discussed in [27] are out of
scope of this paper.
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Figure 2: Audio Fingerprint Generation
sign the sound generated from manufacturing a verifi-
able benign 3D object. As with an approach proposed
for the detection of hardware Trojans [1], after the sound
is recorded, the compliance of the printed 3D object to
the blueprint can be validated using destructive methods;
only then the recorded sound can be used as a “finger-
print” of a valid manufacturing process. The workflow
of this process is illustrated in figure 2. The input of this
workflow is either an STL or G-code file of an object
that is produced in a lab environment and the audio sig-
nal is recorded. The fingerprint on the audio signal is
calculated (subsection 3.2), encrypted, and concatenated
to the G-code file. When the same 3D object is manufac-
tured again, its validity can be verified by comparing the
sound generated during the manufacturing process to the
sound of the signed fingerprint.
In industrial settings, when manufacturing large runs
of the same 3D object, fingerprint generation can be per-
formed and verified by the manufacturer.
3.2 Master Audio Fingerprint Generation
There are several approaches for audio fingerprinting,
depending on the tasks and challenges involved [5]. The
scheme used for this paper is inspired by the idiosyn-
crasies of the noise emitted by the mechanical compo-
nents of 3D printers. As shown in [11], all four stepper
motors on an FDM 3D printer produce noise with unique
characteristics; furthermore, these characteristics distin-
Figure 3: Audio Fingerprint Generation: (a) original sig-
nal, (b) spectrum after running FFT, (c) gray-scale repre-
sentation after dimension reduction with PCA algorithm,
(d) numeric representation of audio fingerprint
guish a motor movement’s direction and, loosely, speed.
Therefore, we claim that similar motor movements will
lead to similar acoustic patterns that can be parametrized
and matched to ensure manufacturing process authentic-
ity.
3D printing acoustic patterns are limited to roughly
fixed patterns concentrated in specific frequency ranges,
since they are generated by a fixed combination of me-
chanical transitions. A common audio fingerprinting ap-
proach is to create a summary of an audio recording
by parametrizing unique acoustic anchor points in fre-
quency and time.
We propose to generate a fingerprint of a FDM 3D
printing process via the following steps (see Figure 3).
First, we divide the original audio recording into equidis-
tant overlapping time frames and apply a Fast Fourier
Transform (FFT) on each of these frames. We then use
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [18], which com-
presses the data by reducing the number of dimensions
with minimal loss of information. The use of PCA en-
ables pattern identification in the signal and the compar-
ison of different signals. The outcome of the PCA trans-
formation step can then be represented as a matrix.
The output of this approach is a text file containing
the audio fingerprint. This can be used as a master file
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textual summary (MFTS) for the printing process.
Algorithm 1 Audio Fingerprint Generation
1: function AUDIOFINGERPRINTCREATION(signal)
2: TrimByMarkers(signal)
3: downsample = Resample(signal,2000)
4: S= spectrogram(downsample,0.75,0.1,1000,20)
5: S = S−mean(S)
6: covariance = S∗ST
7: [E] = eigs(covariance,3)
8: E = E/norm
9: MFT S = S∗E
return < E,MFT S >
10: end function
Algorithm 1 depicts the pseudo code of the algorithm
we use to generate the master fingerprint.
Line 2: First, we bound the audio signal to the sec-
tion directly related to the manufacturing process.
To synchronize between the audio recording device
and the 3D printer, we insert audible markers at
the beginning and end of the 3D printing process.
We used the beep command (M300) and the Dwell
command (G4) to signal the boundaries. This al-
lows us to trim off irrelevant data.
Line 3: Preliminary experiments indicated that, for our
3D printer, a bandwidth of 1kHz captures most
of the relevant acoustic information. Therefore,
according to the Nyquist rate, the original audio
recording can be downsampled to 2kHz without in-
troducing errors. The dowsampling step includes
a low-pass filtering of all signals with frequency
above 1kHz. Downsampling reduces the compu-
tation difficulty of further steps and discards less-
informative high frequency regions.
Line 4: Then the spectogram showing the power den-
sity of the downsampled audio record is calculated2.
We have selected the following spectrogram pa-
rameters: the signal is segmented into overlapping
frames of 0.75 seconds with a stepping factor of 0.1
second; the FFT resolution is 20 Hz, resulting in 50
bins up to 1000 Hz, the signal bandwith. The spec-
trum of each frame generates a gray-level column
along the frequency axis at the corresponding sig-
nal time slot. Darker levels represent higher energy
densities and brighter levels represent lower energy
densities (image (b) in Figure 3).
2A spectrogram can be created by sequentially calculating the mag-
nitude of the spectrum of overlapping frames of the signal using a Fast
Fourier Transform (FFT) implementation like [12].
Figure 4: Eigenvalues of the calculated eigenvectors
Line 5 through 8: Next, we apply Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) [18], a technique that compresses
the data by reducing the number of dimensions,
without much loss of information. The PCA trans-
formation consists of several steps. First, the data
is centered by removing the mean spectrum (static
component) from each frequency bin in step 5. This
helps remove potential channel mismatch between
the current recording and future recordings. Then
the data covariance is calculated (line 6). Covari-
ance measures the “spread” of a set of points around
their center of mass (mean). Thus, we measure how
much the dimensions vary from the mean with re-
spect to each other. We then calculate the eigenvec-
tors of the covariance matrix in step 7 and normalize
them in step 8.
The eigenvalues in PCA indicate the data variance
that is associated to a specific eigenvector. There-
fore, the highest eigenvalue indicates the highest
variance in the data was observed in the direction
of its eigenvector. Accordingly, by using all the
eigenvectors, we can represent all the variance in
the data. In figure 4, we show a graph of the ex-
plained variance gained by adding each extra eigen-
vector. PCA, besides compression, may help reduce
noise by eliminating secondary effects found on the
less significant eigenvectors. We have empirically
identified that 3 eigenvectors are sufficient to repre-
sent the recordings for audio fingerprint generation
and comparison.
Line 9: PCA uses the main eigenvectors of the covari-
ance of the observed data to project it onto an or-
thogonal low-dimensional subspace. The learned
subspace is shown to be closely related to the
subspace spanned by the data centroids obtained
through unsupervised clustering [8]. These cen-
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troids are expected to summarize the set of acous-
tical patterns corresponding to the printer set of ac-
tions. Therefore, the final step ( 9) of the algorithm
is to project the spectogram matrix onto the three
selected eigenvectors, which generate a stream of
vectors of length three every 0.1 second.
Algorithm output: The outputs of the algorithm are the
MFTS and the three selected eigenvectors that were
calculated for the audio master file.
3.3 Audio Fingerprint Comparison
Figure 5 illustrates the verification process. The signed
G-code is printed on a 3D printer of the same model used
to create the fingerprint. The audio signal is recorded via
a special mobile device application, which receives the
signed G-code file, decrypts the MFTS and the eigenvec-
tors and compares the recorded audio signal to the MFTS
as described in algorithm 2.
In order to verify the integrity of a new audio record-
ing, we use a similar algorithm to extract the textual sum-
mary of the audio signal and compare it to MFTS.
The algorithm receives three parameters: the signal of
the new 3D printing recording , the MFTS, and the three
eigenvectors associate with the MFTS.
Algorithm 2 Audio Fingerprint Comparison
1: function AUDIOFINGERPRINTCOMPARI-
SON(signal,E,MFT S)
2: TrimByMarkers(signal)
3: downsample = Resample(signal,2000)
4: S= spectrogram(downsample,0.75,0.1,1000,20)
5: S = S−mean(S)
6: a f terPCA = S∗E
7: similarity = cos(a f terPCA,MFT S)
8: similarity = smooth(similarity,3)
return similarity
9: end function
Line 2 through 5: The initial preparatory operations
are identical to those in Algorithm 1.
Line 6: We next calculate the a f terPCA value as a pro-
jection of the spectogram on the eigenvectors that
were determined in Algorithm 1.
Line 7: We then use cosine metrics to quantify the sim-
ilarity the two vectors. Cosine similarity measures
the cosine of the angle between vectors, meaning
that identical vectors receive a score of 1; a 0 indi-
cates that there is no correlation between the vec-
tors. Vectors that are correlated in the opposite di-
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Figure 5: Audio Fingerprint Verification
rection will be scored -1. For our case, lower sim-
ilarity numbers indicate miscorrelation. At the end
of this step we obtain a stream of similarity coeffi-
cients.
Line 8: We apply a moving average filter to smooth
out short-term acoustic fluctuations at the similarity
stream output and to alleviate light pattern misalign-
ments. Note that the smoothing filter span should
match the desired resolution level in the verification
processes. For instance, a short span is required for
mismatch detection of fine printing movements but
it would likely lead to an increase in false positives,
especially in a noisy environment. In our experi-
ments, we set the filter span to 3 (=0.3 sec.)
Alignment is critical for this algorithm since the sim-
ilarity is calculated by the cosine similarity of frames at
the same time offset. Any misalignment might produce
negative results.
4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we present the experimental evaluation of
the proposed algorithm. We discuss the setup, the mod-
ifications that were inserted into the 3D designs and the
results (i.e the comparison graphs of the recordings).
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Figure 6: Audio comparison between 3D printing process of identical cubes (smoothing factor of 10)
4.1 Experimental Setup
All the experiments were performed in a lab environ-
ment. In the lab we used common PCs to create the G-
code files that were copied to a SD card that was inserted
into the 3D printer. We printed on a BCN3D Sigma
printer that has independent dual extrusion (IDEX) tech-
nology, meaning that the 3D printer has 2 extruder heads
that operate independently. The 3D printer runs the
”BCN3D Sigma – Marlin” firmware and uses FDM tech-
nology. The maximum noise level this 3D printer reaches
is 58 dB.
The software used for slicing the STL files is Cura-
BCN3D, a version of the open source Cura software cus-
tomized for the Sigma 3D printer. The design modifi-
cations were created by either changing properties in the
Cura-BCD3D software or by modifying the G-code files.
The audio recordings of the 3D printing process were
taken using freeware applications on mobile devices.
During the 3D printing process, the mobile device was
placed adjacent to the 3D printer and recorded the audio
in stereo at 44.1kHz.
4.2 Experiments
We began by generating the audio signature of a sim-
ple cube, then verified that the signature was consistent
across 15 identical cubes. Then, for each modification
type in figure 8, we have recorded 2 unmodified objects
and at least 3 modified objects. The modified files were
crafted in a decreasing significant of effects in order to
determine the detection limits of this method. One of the
audio recordings of the unmodified 3D object was used
for the computation of master audio fingerprint (consist
of < E,MFT S > tuple generated by Algorithm 1). The
other audio recordings were used in Algorithm 2 to ver-
ify the detectability of modifications, and to determine
false positive and negative rates.
While the majority of the experiments were carried out
on the cube geometry, we have validated them on rect-
angles, pyramids, and more complex geometries (e.g., a
propeller).
4.3 Experimental Results
In this subsection we outline the experiments that were
performed, focusing on determining normal and abnor-
mal behavior and narrowing down on the algorithm’s
limitations. We’ve also recreated the modification that
was presented in the dr0wned attack [2] to test the pro-
posed detection method. We have recorded the audio
signals of benign and modified propellers and compared
their audio fingerprints. The algorithm has detected a
significant deviation in the modified propeller. This is
expected, since the modification was done on the STL
file. Thus, the original and the modified STL files were
sliced separately, creating different flows of G-code com-
mands, resulting in dissimilar audio fingerprints.
Note that the graphs in this section are plotted with
different smoothing factors. This is done for visual aid.
The verification algorithm was calculated on data with
the smoothing factor of 3.
4.3.1 Normal and Abnormal Behavior
In order to determine the tolerance of the algorithm,
we’ve examined audio recordings of identical G-code
files when compared to the pre-recorded audio master
file. We have recorded 15 identical cubes in different set-
tings and plotted the results of the comparison algorithm
(algorithm 2).
Figure 6 depicts the output of algorithm 2 (compari-
son of audio fingerprints) for two identical cubes. The
plot for the first cube (Cube1) is representative for the
vast majority of the tested audio recordings for unmod-
ified 3D objects (12 out of 15); where the correlation
value determined in Algorithm 2 concentrates around 0.8
- 0.9 values. The second cube (Cube2) represents a be-
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nign cube that causes a false positive detection. We can
see that in the beginning of the recording there is a large
plunge down in correlation. However, the graph syncs
back. We have observed the re-syncronization always
occurs on benign prints and is a indicator of integrity.
However, this feature can mask some attacks that we will
demonstrate later in this section.
From these results, we have learned about the normal
behavior of the graph for comparing identical objects.
We’ve seen that the correlation between the MFTS and
each of the audio files in the test set is very high. For
some of the compared files we can see periodic down-
ward spikes that normally result from background noise,
but they are rare and the correlation returns to higher val-
ues.
When comparing against modified objects, it is possi-
ble to detect not only a deviation from the expected pat-
tern but also the exact point when the first modification
occurs. In figure 7 we can see the fingerprint comparison
between the benign “Cube1” recording and recordings of
two modified cubes. The similarity of Cube1’s recording
to the MFTS is high throughout the whole manufactur-
ing process; the only deviations are sparse spikes of re-
duced correlation. The audio recordings of the 3D print-
ing process of the modified cubes lose synchronization
exactly when the modification of the G-code instruction
sequence occurs. The “Bad1” cube’s G-code contains
two dummy moves at layer 20 out of 40. We can see
that the graph loses synchronization at about the middle
of the recording. In the cube marked “Bad2”, we’ve re-
moved a single G1 printing command at layer 30. We
can see that the graph loses synchronization towards the
last quarter of the recording.
4.3.2 Detection Limits
Determining the detectability limit of this technique re-
lies on the minimal malicious deviations that can be in-
troduced. Attacks discussed in the literature are modifi-
cations of the 3D object geometry [21, 30, 6, 2], 3D ob-
ject orientation during the printing process [27, 30], and
manipulations of the manufacturing process [27]. All
these attacks result in changes to tool path instructions.
Attacks involving malicious firmware can deliberately
misinterpret G-Code commands [17], but these manip-
ulations result in actual tool path changes; these can be
described (and tested) as changes introduced into the G-
code. Therefore, for the evaluation of the proposal’s lim-
itations, we’ve tested changes at the individual G-Code
command level. Table 8 summarizes the results of those
experiments. More specifically, we’ve tested the follow-
ing modifications:
1. Insertion of additional G-Code commands
2. Deletion of G-Code commands included in the tool
path of a benign 3D object
3. Modification of parameters to an individual move-
ment command along one axis
4. Modification of the extruder’s speed
5. Reordering of G-code commands
Figure 8: Summary of the detection results on various
modifications
To analyze the detection thresholds, we’ve performed
controlled tests on sections of 20 seconds of audio
recordings. We used a cube due to its repetitive geom-
etry; each section translates to exactly 4 layers in the
cube. Each section was marked with the audio marker
and the modification was inserted in the 3rd layer, i.e., in
the second half of the recording.
For every modification type, we’ve tested decreasing
levels of deviations and validated whether or not such
deviations can be detected with the proposed approach.
The comparison was performed with a smoothing fac-
tor of 3; a lower factor would improve the detection res-
olution while increasing the false positive rate.
Insertion of Commands We’ve inserted additional G0
commands into the manipulated G-code files. The G0
command translates to a movement of the extruder to
the specified X and Y coordinates without extruding the
filament. Figure 9 shows the original and the modified
G-code commands of one file; two additional G0 com-
mands were inserted. Figure 10 shows the similarity
graph comparing the 3D printing process of three mod-
ified G-code files and the audio master file. They con-
tained four, two and a single inserted G0 command, re-
spectively. The addition of G0 commands desynchro-
nizes the prints, and consequently the degree of similar-
ity degrades dramatically right after the execution of the
inserted commands.
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Figure 7: Audio comparison between valid and modified 3D prints (smoothing factor of 10)
Figure 9: Insertion of two G0 moves in G-code
Figure 10: Audio comparison of original cube versus
three modified cubes. The modification: insertion of G0
moves
Deletion of Commands The G1 command moves the
extruder to a specified (X, Y) coordinate while extrud-
ing filament. Changes to the 3D object geometry (both
internal and external) will likely involve modifying G1
commands. To validate the detectability of such changes,
we’ve deleted G1 commands from the G-code files. Fig-
ure 11 shows both the original and the modified G-code
commands on one file. Figure 12 shows the similarity
graph comparing the 3D printing process of the unmod-
ified and two modified files. They had four and two re-
moved G1 commands, respectively. Even the deletion of
a single G1 command breaks synchronization; this is re-
flected by the dramatic degradation of the degree of sim-
ilarity right after the removed G-code command in line
”Bad2” in figure 7.
Figure 11: Deletion of two G1 print moves in G-code
Figure 12: Audio comparison of original cube versus two
modified cubes. The modification: deletion of G1 print
moves
Modification of Movement Length on the Axis We
have tested several modifications to movements along the
axes, including extended and shortened move length. For
both we successively reduced the length of the deviation
from the original command and observed the impact on
the similarity plot.
The minimum change which still broke synchroniza-
tion at our smoothing factor was a modification of 1 cm
in length on a single G1 print command. This break is
similar to inserting or deleting a G1 print command in
figure 10. Modifications of 0.5 cm and 0.2 cm also break
the synchronization, but the degree of similarity does not
degraded as drastically.
Figure 13 shows the original and the modified G-code
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commands; the modification extends the Y-axis move-
ment by 0.5 cm. Figure 14 shows the similarity graph
between the original audio file and the recordings of two
modified G-code files with the extensions of 0.5 cm and
0.2 cm respectively. The experiments have been per-
formed for all three axes, and present uniform detectabil-
ity thresholds.
Figure 13: Extend a single G1 print move in G-code
Figure 14: Audio comparison of original cube versus a
modified cube. The modification: extending the move-
ments on one of the axis.
Modification of Extruder’s Speed The amount of the
filament deposited during a movement is a function of the
speed of the nozzle movement and the speed of the fila-
ment extrusion motor (both controlled by G-code com-
mand G1) . Modifying the feedrate parameter in G1
commands changes the speed of the executed move.
In this case it is more difficult to state the minimal
change needed to break synchronization since there are
two factors involved: the length of the move and the orig-
inal feedrate of the command. We saw that we can break
syncronization by slowing down the travel speed of two
G1 print commands (length move of 1 cm).
We have performed experiments to identify the thresh-
old at which changes of the extruded filament can be de-
tected. Figure 15 shows the original and the modified
extrusion speed parameter of G-code command G1. Fig-
ure 16 shows the similarity graph generated for the mod-
ified G-code file containing a feedrate change on two G1
commands by half (1500 to 750).
Figure 15: Extend a single G1 print move in G-code
Figure 16: Audio comparison of original cube versus a
modified cubes. The modification: changing the feedrate
parameter of move commands
Reordering of G-code commands Reordering G-
code commands does not modify the geometry of the ob-
ject, but might effect the quality of the object. However,
reordering a few commands does not appear to hurt the
overall syncronization. Figure 17 contains the modified
G-code. For one of the 3D printed cube’s layers, the new
G-code file contains the same commands but in a differ-
ent order. The similarity plot in Figure 18 shows that
this causes a disturbance while the reordered commands
are executed. However, since the overall timing has not
changed, the line syncs back up afterwards (layer 4 out
of 4). When we examine the effect of the reordering on
the comparison graph of the entire cube (see Figure 19),
we can see a noticeable disturbance near the beginning
of the file but none afterward. We conclude that the re-
ordering of commands will be noticeable but difficult to
distinguish from disturbances introduced by background
noise.
Figure 17: Reorder 3 G1 print commands in G-code
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Figure 18: Audio comparison of original cube versus a
modified cube. The modification: reorder of 3 G1 print
commands
Figure 19: Audio comparison of original cube versus a
modified cube. The modification: reorder of 6 G1 print
commands in layer 8 out of 50 (smoothing factor of 5)
4.3.3 Testing Disturbances
There are several factors that can influence the signal of
an audio recording. In order to test the resilience of the
proposed solution to factors like recording device, mi-
crophone position, and background noise, we performed
several audio recordings while introducing disturbances.
Below we describe the tested disturbances.
Different Recording Devices The audio signal would
be recorded by different applications on different mobile
devices. In Figure 20, the recordings were taken by a
different mobile device than the master file.
Recording Positions Part of the experiments tested
different recording positions near the 3D printer. While
the audio master file was recorded with the microphone
at the left side of the 3D printer above the extruder, two
further audio recording were taken with the microphones
at the right side of the printer and in the front, about 20
cm below the extruder head. Figure 20 show similarity
plots for audio recordings taken at different locations.
Background Noise The recordings were done in a lab
environment, some at night in a quiet environment, oth-
ers during daytime with mild background noise. The
effects introduced by the noisy environment appear as
Figure 20: Audio comparison graph of cubes recorded
from different positions and by different mobile device
than the audio master file (smoothing factor of 10)
short plunges in the similarity graph. These are limited
to the duration of the noise; the background noise does
not affect synchronization of audio recordings. In an ex-
tremely loud environment with permanent background
noise, this behavior might cause false positives.
Figure 21: Audio signal of a recording of a cube with
introduced loud background noises
Figure 22: Audio comparison of original cube and an
identical cube that was recorded with introduced back-
ground noises (smoothing factor of 5)
4.4 Algorithm Limitations
Since pattern similarity is calculated on a frame-by-
frame basis, the algorithm relies on time synchroniza-
tion. Modifications that cause a momentary mismatch
but do not break the overall syncronization might there-
fore be interpreted as false positives. The main limitation
we have discovered is in detecting command replace-
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ments of identical length, e.g., replacing G1 print com-
mands with dummy G0 move commands with the same
frequency. The move still takes place, but without fila-
ment extrusion. Since this does not affect the subsequent
synchronization, the audio difference is momentary. We
have tested the replacement of two G1 print moves with
G0 moves of the same feedrate (figure 23). The audio
recording of this modification is highly correlated with
the audio master file as shown in figure 24.
Figure 23: Replace 2 G1 commands with G0 commands
in G-code
Figure 24: Audio comparison of original cube versus a
modified cube. The modification: Replace 2 G1 com-
mands with G0 commands
4.5 Modification Indicator
To detect modifications, we have looked for significant
changes in the mean value of the signal. To eliminate
large, brief dips in the correlation value, many of which
are due to background noise, we apply a large smooth-
ing factor to the similarity graph. We have calculated the
mean value for time frames of 5 seconds and looked for
sections where the graph decreases overall at least 0.4
points for 4 consecutive time frames. Figure 25 shows
false positive and negative examples. Most of the iden-
tical cubes do not pass this value, except for cube ”Nor-
mal4” that starts out of sync. For the modified cubes, we
can see that there are rapid significant decreases in the
graph, which pass the threshold and are flagged as ma-
licious. The cube marked ”Reorder”, which contains 6
reordered print commands, gives a borderline result, and
is barely detected by this indicator.
Figure 25: Plot of the mean value for time frames of 10
seconds on selected prints
Figure 26: Signed G-code file format
5 Signature Verification Use Cases
In this section we discuss how the audio fingerprint is at-
tached to the signed G-code file and the verification pro-
cess. Then, we present several use cases for this verifica-
tion method.
After running the fingerprint generation algorithm (al-
gorithm 1), we have a tuple of the eigenvectors that were
calculated for the original audio signal and the MFTS.
This is encrypted using the private key of some Verifi-
cation Entity (VE), who varies depending on scenario.
This data is appended as a comment to the G-code file as
illustrated in figure 26.
Since the verification algorithm is sequential, verifica-
tion can be done in real-time. To facilitate this, the VE
has to release a mobile device application that contains
its public key. The application receives the signed G-
code file, decrypts the second part of the file using the
VE’s public key and starts recording the audio signal of
the new printing process. It monitors for the start marker
and then for every frame in the audio, it calculates the
signature and compares it to the corresponding frame in
the MFTS.
This real-time detection method indicates a possible
deviation from the audio master file exactly at the point
of the modification, thus saving time and material.
We see several application scenarios of the proposed
manufacturing process verification. In the consumer
market, a custom app for a mobile phone could imple-
ment both algorithms. An desktop 3D printer user could
use this app to record a 3D printing process and mark it
as a “master fingerprint.” When the same 3D object is
printed on the same equipment, the app can record and
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verify the manufacturing process.
A drawback of this approach is that a consumer end-
user is unlikely to be able to verify whether the first
printed object was compliant to the original blueprint
file. However, the end-user can still rely on their own
experience of the first object, i.e., whether or not the ob-
ject’s quality was sufficient for the intended application.
In industrial settings the same application could be used
and, after recording of a master audio fingerprint, the
manufactured object can be verified with non-destructive
and/or destructive methods.
Another use case is a possible tamper-proof verifica-
tion that an OEM can offer as a service. Here we use
as an example the high-end Voxel8 FDM 3D printer. In-
stead of using a local PC to slice and to translate the 3D
object’s blueprint into a tool path, an end-user is sub-
mits the blueprint to a cloud service; then, when the user
prints the design, translation operations are performed by
the cloud service and a tool path is sent to the 3D printer
via network. It is easy to imagine that such an OEM can
integrate an audio recording device into the 3D printer.
After a 3D object is printed first time, a master finger-
print can be generated and stored in the cloud. Every
time an end-user prints the same model, the audio record-
ing can be verified against the stored master fingerprint;
in case of deviations, the end-user can be notified that
the printed object might have been tampered with. We
see this as an attractive service that might be offered by
OEMs. In industrial settings, such as automotive shops,
this approach would ensure the necessary quality of the
part; furthermore, a cloud-based approach might be at-
tractive to prevent IP infringement.
We also consider to peer-verification of printed objects
using the proposed approach. In examples like an auto
shop, multiple users will print the same parts at different
locations. We assume that master files can be recorded
for all printers, in order to accommodate possible devi-
ations in mechanical components and resulting discrep-
ancies in sound. Nevertheless, master audio fingerprints
from different sites could be peer-verified against each
other, within certain tolerances. This approach could
identify compromised sites, with master audio finger-
prints dissimilar to their peers.
6 Related Work
THe security of Additive Manufacturing is a research
area pioneered around 2014 [23, 21, 25, 24, 7, 13]. So
far, two major threat categories have been identified for
AM: (1) sabotage and (2) violation of Intellectual Prop-
erty (IP). Sabotage attacks aim to inflict physical dam-
age, e.g., by compromising part quality or by damag-
ing AM equipment. IP violation attacks aim to illegally
replicate 3D objects or the manufacturing process itself.
Additionally, several articles discuss misuse of 3D print-
ers for manufacturing of illegal items, e.g., firearms, or
components of explosive devices; The analysis in a re-
cent paper [26] shows that there are no specific technical
challenges of the latter (but rather legal and policy is-
sues). For this paper, only sabotage is considered.
To our knowledge, the first proof of concept com-
promise of a desktop 3D printer was presented at
XCon20133 by Xiao Zi Hang (Claud Xiao) [23]. Among
other things, the keynote argues that the size (and thus
integrability) of a printed part can be modified, the tem-
perature of the filament extruder can be manipulated, etc.
Several publications have analyzed 3D printers and
3D printing processes for vulnerabilities. Turner et al.,
2015 [22] found that networking and communication
systems lack integrity checks when receiving the design
files. Moore et al., 2016 [16] identified numerous vul-
nerabilities in software, firmware, and communication
protocol commonly used in desktop 3D printers; these
can be potentially be exploited. Do et al., 2016 [9] have
shown that communication protocols employed by desk-
top 3D printers can be exploited, enabling the retrieval of
current and previously printed 3D models, halting an ac-
tive printing job, or submitting a new one. Belikovetsky
et al., 2017 [2] used a fishing attack to install a backdoor
that enabled arbitrary, targeted manipulations of design
files by a remote adversary. Sturm et al., 2014 [21] used
malware pre-installed on a computer to automate the ma-
nipulation of STL files. Moore et al., 2016 [17] used ma-
licious firmware to modify and substitute a printed 3D
model.
A growing body of publications discusses how a man-
ufactured part’s quality can be compromised. The ma-
jority of publications focuses on Fused Deposition Mod-
eling (FDM), commonly used in desktop 3D printers.
Sturm et al., 2014 [21] demonstrated that a part’s ten-
sile strength can be degraded by introducing defects such
as voids (internal cavities). Zeltmann et al., 2016 [30]
showed that similar results can be achieved by printing
part of the structure with the contaminated material. Be-
likovetsky et al, 2017 [2] proposed to degrade a part’s
fatigue life; the authors argue that the defect’s size, ge-
ometry, and location are factors in the degradation. Yam-
polskiy et al, 2015 [27] argued that the anisotropy char-
acteristic of 3D printed parts can be misused to degrade
a part’s quality, if an object is printed in the wrong ori-
entation. Zeltmann et al., 2016 [30] have experimentally
shown the impact of this attack on part’s tensile strength,
using 90 and 45 degree rotations of the printed model.
Chhetri et al., 2016 [6] introduced a skew along one of
the build axes as an attack. Moore et al., 2016 [17] mod-
ified the amount of extruded source material to compro-
3XCon2013 speakers: http://xcon.xfocus.org/XCon2013/speakers.html
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mise the printed object’s geometry. Pope et al., 2016 [19]
identified that indirect manipulations like the modifica-
tion of network command timing and energy supply in-
terruptions can be potential means of sabotaging a part.
Yampolskiy et al, 2015 [27] discussed various metal AM
process parameters whose manipulation can sabotage a
part’s quality; for the powder bed fusion (PBF) pro-
cess, the identified parameters include heat source en-
ergy, scanning strategy, layer thickness, source material
properties like powder size and form, etc. Yampolskiy
et al., 2016 [29] argued that in the case of metal AM,
manipulations of manufacturing parameters can not only
sabotage a part’s quality, but also damage the AM ma-
chine, or lead to the contamination of its environment.
Chhetri et al, 2016 [6] present the only method pub-
lished so far for the detection of sabotage attacks. The
authors use the acoustic side-channel inherent to the
FDM process. The reported detection rate of object mod-
ifications is 77.45%.
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